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ABSTRACT 
At the time of the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, the 
Islamic State was on the brink of defeat. With roughly 700 members remaining, 
the movement initiated a well-designed and rigorously executed revolutionary 
campaign, first in Iraq and then Syria. By June of 2014, a movement once 
dismissed as “junior varsity” was dominating eastern Syria and routing divisions 
of the Iraqi Army.  
This thesis develops a model of revolutionary growth and employs it as a 
tool to evaluate the Islamic State’s campaign from 2011 through 2014. This 
evaluation reveals the significance and logic of Islamic State car bomb attacks 
against the Iraqi Security Forces and Shia civilians. The analysis explains how 
and why the Islamic State forges alliances and eliminates rival movements and 
tribal organizations. This evaluation illuminates the Islamic State’s internal 
structure and methodology for governing territory to support further growth.  
This thesis allows the reader to form a better understanding of the 
integrated strategy of the Islamic State, so as to be better prepared to contribute 
to current efforts to combat the movement—in Iraq, Syria, and other troubled 
nations.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Islamic State shocked many in June of 2014 when the movement 
seized Mosul during what appeared to be a rapid military offensive in Northern 
Iraq. The Mosul offensive demonstrated the Islamic State's significant growth 
since the end of the United States mission in Iraq. The movement routed two 
Iraqi Army Divisions, totaling approximately 30,000 soldiers, from northern Iraq.1 
Just two-and-a-half years earlier, the Islamic State was on the brink of defeat. 
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta testified before Congress in June 2011 that only 
1,000 Islamic State (then called Al Qaeda in Iraq) members remained. Senior 
Iraqi intelligence officials estimated the number was down to roughly 700 by the 
end of the year.2 How did they reverse this and rapidly grow into formidable 
revolutionary movement? 
When examined carefully, this operational victory was not merely the 
product of refined guerrilla warfare operations against a fledgling Iraqi military 
force. The fall of Mosul and other population centers within the Sunni regions of 
Iraq and Syria were the product of a lengthy and effective campaign of broader 
activities. These revolutionary activities are frequently overlooked, leading to a 
lack of understanding of the nature and course of internal conflicts. While efforts 
to contain and defeat the Islamic State may eventually become successful, 
understanding how the movement returned to preeminence is essential.  
This thesis explains how the Islamic State rebuilt itself from near defeat in 
2011 to dominating major portions of Iraq and Syria in 2014. To accomplish this, I 
will first develop a model of revolutionary movement growth through the 
integration of previously established theory. This model organizes movement 
                                            
1 Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy, and Spencer Ackerman, “Iraq Army Capitulates to ISIS 
Militants in Four Cities,” The Guardian, June 11, 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states. 
2 Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Lara Jakes, “Al Qaeda Iraq Strength Musters,” Associated Press, 
October 10, 2012, http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/middle-east/7797190/Al-Qaeda-Iraqi-strength-
musters. 
 2
actions into categories based on their foci—actions directed at the state, actions 
directed at competing movements, and actions directed at the population. See 
Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the model. I then evaluate the 
significant Islamic State actions within each category, and how the actions 
contribute to movement’s growth in Iraq and Syria. This knowledge is critically 
important, as the Islamic State remains formidable in the Middle East and has 
loyal affiliates from Africa to Afghanistan. 
A. REVOLUTIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTION  
Revolutions are defined in two ways: by the goals of the participating 
movements and the nature of the conflict between them. Revolutions may be 
described as an effort undertaken by a movement seeking to drastically alter or 
replace existing social, economic, and political institutions.3 Revolutions are also 
internal state conflicts consisting of a competition between an incumbent 
government (henceforth referred to as the state) and one or more movements for 
the support and control of the population.4 These definitions are linked, as 
support and control of the population enables revolutionary movements to grow 
and ultimately accomplish their aims of changing social, economic, and political 
institutions.5 Given these characteristics, the Islamic State is better understood 
as a revolutionary movement than merely a terrorist organization. 
Literature shows varying theories regarding the driving forces behind the 
formation and conduct of revolutions. These theories may be sorted into two 
general schools of thought: Theories that recognize structural conditions as the 
seminal factor leading to revolution, and those that recognize actors and action 
                                            
3 James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 2007), 10–27. 
4 Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare.” Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, January–March, 2015 
5 Jack A. Goldstone, ed. Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies (San 
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). 
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as primarily important.6 Both perspectives are highly relevant to understanding 
the actions of revolutionary movements, as they are not mutually exclusive. 
Structural conditions impact the feasibility of revolutionary actions, and activities 
undertaken by revolutionary movements alter the existing structural conditions. 
However, analysis through the perspective of revolutionary movement action is 
more pertinent to the practitioner. Through this lens, it is possible to understand 
what actions directly and indirectly lead to revolutionary movement growth and 
eventual obtainment of movement objectives.  
 
Figure 1.  A Model of Revolutionary Movement Growth 
I organize the literature describing the growth of revolutionary movements 
into three categories. These are actions directed at the state, actions directed at 
competing movements, and actions directed at the population. Revolutionary 
actions directed at the state are intended to erode the state’s control over the 
population, and render it unacceptable in the realm of public opinion.7 
Revolutionary actions directed at other movements are intended to eliminate or 
                                            
6 Theda, Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, 
and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3–32.  
7 Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security 31, 
no. 1 (Summer 2006): 49–80. 
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co-opt competitors to establish a monopoly over the support of the population. 
Actions directed at the population are intended to solidify the movement’s control 
over a geographic region and extract resources for growth.8  
B. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE STATE 
Revolutionary actions directed at the state are intended to shape the 
relationship between the state and the population. Understanding this 
relationship is key, and it can be shaped in two ways. The first way is to discredit 
the state’s reputation among the population. For the population to support a 
revolutionary movement, it helps to view the state with a degree of illegitimacy. 
Discrediting the state provides the population with a degree of motivation to 
support a revolution. The second way to impact the relationship between the 
state and the population is to erode the state’s control over the population. To 
achieve this, revolutionary movements must undertake actions that disrupt the 
state’s mechanisms that enforce the status quo, creating the opportunity for the 
movement growth to occur. Revolutionary movements must understand the 
relationship between the state and the population, and how actions directed at 
the state will impact the opportunity and motivation for revolution.  
Taking an in-depth look at state legitimacy, there are multiple theories that 
describe how a state falls out of favor with the population. A social structure 
perspective describes a balance between the collective values of the population 
and those espoused by the state. When these entities fall out of synchronization, 
disorder occurs. States seek to maintain order through incremental reform of 
domestic policies and the enforcement of social norms. If these measures fail—
or are not attempted—the population will increasingly view the state as 
                                            
8 William R. Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in 
Dinh Tuong Province, 1960–1964 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973). 
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illegitimate. This condition is conducive to the growth of revolutionary 
movements.9  
The social structure perspective is best exemplified by the French 
Revolution of 1787–1789. The absolute monarchy that preceded the revolution 
was stagnant and unable to reform according to changing social dynamics. The 
growth of an educated middle class and awareness of Enlightenment ideas 
created incongruence between the expectations of the population and the 
policies of the government. This social incongruence gave rise to one of the more 
notorious revolutions in European history.10 
A second perspective on the relationship between the state and the 
population is that of aggregate dissatisfaction. This school of thought shares the 
conditions-based perspective of the social structure theory, but acknowledges 
that the motivations for revolution among the population are difficult to trace and 
varied from individual to individual. Collective dissatisfaction is the summation of 
grievances across the population, or population segments.11  
This is most true during the beginnings of revolutionary events, as was the 
case during the 1979 revolution in Iran. Prior to actions taken by religious 
fundamentalists, collective dissatisfaction was traceable to a variety of issues. 
Poor economic opportunity, a lack of social justice, conservative cultural ideals, 
and a lack of political access were all contributing factors to popular discontent. 
Determining which condition was initially most formative is difficult, lending 
importance to the aggregation of dissatisfaction.12 
                                            
9 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1982), 16–60. 
10 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 3–32. 
11 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 40th Anniversary Ed. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 
2010). 
12 Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
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These theories inform revolutionary movements with knowledge for 
identifying the sources of a population’s motivations for revolution. Revolutionary 
actions directed at the state foster this motivation by disrupting state activities. 
The clandestine sabotage of state efforts to provide essential services is a basic 
example. Disrupting state efforts to meet the needs of the population breeds 
animosity among the population—as was the case during the initial 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq following the 2003 invasion.13  
Revolutionary movement actions can also seek to indirectly erode  
the state’s legitimacy. The state’s use—or misuse—of repression against 
revolutionary movements can further delegitimize the incumbent government. 
Research shows state attempts to use overt oppression against revolutionary 
movements that are not isolated from society can have a counter-productive 
effect on the population, actually increasing public protest against the 
government. Furthermore, revolutionary movements that are viewed as 
threatening by the state are more likely to be targeted with repressive state 
activities. Assuming the revolutionary movement enjoys a degree of integration 
with the population, threatening activities against the state will encourage 
repression against the population. Indirectly, this repression then generates 
outcry and political opportunity for the revolutionary movement.14 15 
Other research has given the moniker “Accidental Guerrilla” to this 
phenomenon.16 In Afghanistan, a small number of Taliban members operating 
out of a village would often provoke a substantial U.S. operation in response. 
These operations often result in collateral damage—not just in lives, but in 
damaged honor or respect. These actions would push members of the population 
                                            
13 Gal Luft, “Reconstructing Iraq: Bringing Iraq’s Economy Back Online.” Middle East 
Quarterly 12 no. 3 (Summer 2005): 25–32.  
14 Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” 
Sociological Theory 21, no. 1 (January 2003): 44–68. 
15 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 49–80. 
16 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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who were otherwise bystanders towards active support of the Taliban. A 
seemingly successful effort to repress a revolutionary movement may indirectly 
cause more damage to the state’s legitimacy17  
These indirect measures of degrading legitimacy require revolutionary 
movements to provoke the state into action. Using violence against politically 
sensitive targets—such as political and military leaders or population centers that 
are beneficiaries of state patrimony—is likely to invite a response against the 
revolutionary movement’s regions of support. If these responses are 
indiscriminate, this actions will further convince the population that the state is 
unacceptable.18 Targeting noncombatants is considered terrorism, and 
anathema to western standards. While this limits its feasibility for support by 
western nations, this abhorrence actually enhances its effectiveness—further 
demanding state action to reciprocate against the revolutionary movement. 
Revolutionary movements often undertake actions directed at the state to 
directly and indirectly discredit it. These actions, which generally include the 
sabotage of services and provocation of repression, further the population’s 
willingness to support a revolutionary movement. This motivation is essential for 
revolutionary movement growth. 
Revolutionary movements should also undertake actions that erode the 
state’s ability to control the population. While provocation increases motivation, 
degrading the state’s measures of control increases the population’s opportunity 
for revolution. Research shows degrading the state’s ability to control the 
population is an important means of generating initial momentum in the early 
stages of a revolutionary movement.19 As revolutionary movements continue to 
grow, further disruption of the state’s ability to control the population can 
                                            
17 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla 
18 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 49–80 
19 Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence 
and Guerrilla Mobilisation,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295–320. 
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generate a bandwagon effect that further increases support for the movement.20 
The conflict between revolutionary movements in Algeria from 1997 to 1998 
shows that populations will typically render support either to the state or a 
revolutionary movement based on the provision of security alone.21  
The use of attrition-oriented attacks is the primary means a revolutionary 
movement can employ to decrease the state’s ability to control the population. 
Increasing the costs of controlling the population—in terms of lives, financial 
resources, and time—negatively impacts the state’s ability achieve sufficient 
levels of state control. Research also suggests that the use of attrition against 
states with a democratic regime type is especially effective, as democracies are 
typically less tolerant to sustained conflict spending.22  
Revolutionary actions directed at the state are essential for movement 
growth. These actions directly and indirectly erode the legitimacy of the state, 
further increasing the population’s motivation to support a revolutionary 
movement. Secondly, revolutionary actions directed at the state degrade the 
state’s ability to control the population—further increasing the opportunity for a 
revolutionary movement to grow.  
C. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT COMPETING 
MOVEMENTS 
To grow, revolutionary movements often undertake actions directed at 
competing movements. Contrary to the American experience during the U.S. 
revolutionary war, contemporary intrastate conflicts are frequently contests with 
multiple revolutionary movements.23 These organizations offer opportunities for 
                                            
20 Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton, and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 321–67. 
21 Stathis Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” Rationality 
and Society 11, no. 3 (August 1999): 243–85. 
22 Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 49–80 
23 Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
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forming coalitions or recruiting movement members. Other organizations may 
represent potential rivals who need to be marginalized. Tribal organizations, 
depending on the region, may also constitute competing movements. Nations 
with a degree of neopatrimonialism—where traditional or tribal leaders wield 
substantial influence over modern political institutions—require revolutionary 
movements to consider these organizations as competing movements.24 
Ultimately, these actions are intended to establish a monopoly over control of the 
revolution.  
Alliance formation is an important form of revolutionary action directed at 
competing movements. According to Christia, warring parties in internal conflicts 
seek to establish the smallest coalition possible that is still large enough to 
achieve victory. This is derived from the logic that coalition make up will translate 
into post-conflict government formation. Alliance formation is complicated further 
by the fluid nature of revolutionary movement strength. As movements grow, 
alliances are likely to break down or new ones formed as movement leaders 
seek to position themselves advantageously for post-conflict politics.25 
Revolutionary movements are often aware of this political gamesmanship, and 
take actions to benefit from it. More successful organizations are prepared to 
forge new alliances with competing movements, and anticipate defections as 
organizations within an alliance increase or decrease in strength.  
Interestingly, research suggests ideology or movement goals are not 
important determinants of how movement leaders choose alliance members. 
However, rank-and-file members of the movements need explanations for why 
competing movements are joining or departing alliances.26 Therefore, it is 
beneficial for movement leaders to describe their objectives as broadly as 
                                            
24 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered: Critical Review and 
Elaboration of an Elusive Concept,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45, no. 1 (March 
2007). 
25 Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars. 
26 Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars. 
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possible to facilitate alliance formation. Synchronizing local grievances into a 
nation-wide master grievance is an essential aspect of revolutionary movement 
growth.27 Revolutionary movement actions directed at competing movements are 
better supported through espousing a rejection of the state instead of a specific 
political solution. Public or private media communications with other group should 
be as generic as possible, and differ from those seeking to influence segments of 
the population.  
Given the limitations on alliance formation, many competing movements 
will be unwilling to participate in a coalition. However, these organizations 
represent opportunities to recruit active revolutionaries. While alliance formation 
presents a temporary wholesale relationship, recruitment is a means to achieve 
more permanent growth on a smaller scale. Revolutionary movements should 
take actions directed at competing movement members and subgroups to 
encourage their defection. Recruiting new members from the ranks of other 
movements is expeditious means of obtaining individuals or sub-movement 
groups with existing experience.28  
Inter-movement recruitment requires special individuals who can bridge 
social relationships across revolutionary movements. These individuals, called 
brokers, are typically not movement leaders themselves—as these individuals 
are too invested into one movement or another. Brokers are essential for 
penetrating and influencing competing organizes or tribes, and revolutionary 
movements foster brokers wherever possible.29  
Interactions with competing organizations offers revolutionary movements 
opportunities to forge alliances or recruit new movement members. However, 
                                            
27 Stathis Kalyvas, “The Ontology of Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,” 
Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (September 2003): 475–94. 
28 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter. But How?” in Social Movement Analysis: The 
Network Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
29 Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of the 
American Revolution,” in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
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revolutionary movements may develop rivalries that lead to violence between 
groups.30 Actions directed at these organizations should parallel those directed 
at the state—revolutionary movements should seek to degrade and discredit 
them. If possible, revolutionary movements should also simultaneously try to 
support defection away from these groups. 
Revolutionary actions directed at competing movements are designed to 
marginalize peer opposition while bolstering movement ranks. Through savvy 
alliance formation, fighter recruitment, and conflict with rival groups, a 
revolutionary movement can achieve dominance over an opportunity for 
revolution. These measures will enable greater access to the population and the 
support it can offer.  
D. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE POPULATION 
While replacing the existing political institutions is the goal of a 
revolutionary movement, governance is also a means to that end. Revolutionary 
movements must take actions directed at the population to support movement 
growth. These actions—best described as governance—seek to accomplish two 
primary tasks: to solidify movement control over a geographic region and 
extrapolate resources for furthering the movement. The ability to control the 
population garners access to resources, and constitutes a form of social contract 
between the movement and population.31 This was well demonstrated by 
Hezbollah, which forged strong bonds with the population through the provision 
of services previously denied by the state.32 
Revolutionary movements have two types of actions at their disposal for 
controlling the population. These actions are the provision of services and 
                                            
30 Stathis Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless?” 
31 Zachariah Cherian Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during 
War (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
32 Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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coercive activities, and are synonymous with positive and negative reinforcement 
measures. The provision of services to the population is a priority for a 
revolutionary movement, as it is important for fostering the legitimacy of the 
movement.33 Just as a revolutionary movement should seek to sabotage the 
services provided by the state, movements must replaces these services with 
their own. In geographic regions where the state has established government 
services, these efforts can be co-opted for use by the revolutionary movement. 
Furthermore, when a movement can improve upon these institutions—such as 
provided access to population segments that were previously excluded—they 
can easily gain credibility.34 Psychologically, individuals and groups are more 
likely to support resource requests if they feel a degree of indebtedness to the 
requestor.35 The provision of services by the revolutionary movement establishes 
a quid pro quo for resources from the population that is difficult for human nature 
to resist. 
Revolutionary movements also have more proactive means at their 
disposal for solidifying control. Measures of indoctrination and radicalization are 
effective means for controlling the population. Research shows that social factors 
are strong tools for indoctrinating the population. Public education programs, 
where individuals attend and learn with and from their community members, are 
an effective means of fostering movement acceptance.36 Over time, the 
population accepts the revolutionary movement as the legitimate authority, which 
enables access to resources. 
Revolutionary movements also often direct actions at the population to 
solidify control in order to garner access to resources. Extracting resources from 
                                            
33 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers. 
34 Mampilly, Rebel Rulers. 
35 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York, NY: Collins, 
2007). 
36 Scott Helfstein, “Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent 
Extremism” (Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, February 2012), 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTC_EdgesofRadicalization.pdf. 
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the population is beneficial for the growth of a revolutionary movement. All of a 
revolutionary movement’s activities are constrained by resource requirements. 
Actions directed at the state and other movements require substantial human 
and material assets. Controlling the population—in order to marshal resources—
is by itself a resource intensive activity.37 Revolutionary movements that are not 
able to extract resources from the population are severely limited. These 
organizations require outside patronage. This outside patronage is likely to come 
with conditions—such as additional political objectives—that may steer the 
movement off course.38  
Revolutionary actions directed at the population seek to establish control 
to gain access to human and material resources. The provision of essential 
services and the application of psychological control levers are central to 
solidifying control. Taxing the population for financial or material resources, or 
conscripting fighters are central to movement growth, and these activities are not 
possible without a requisite degree of control.  
To summarize, revolutionary movements pursue three types of actions to 
grow. Movements must conduct revolutionary actions at the government the 
delegitimize it and erode its ability to control the population. Movements must 
conduct actions directed at rival movements to establish a monopoly over the 
population through co-opting or eliminating other movements. Finally, 
revolutionary movements must pursue actions directed at the population to 
solidify control and extract resources. This thesis will use this model of 
revolutionary movement actions as a tool for assessing the overarching Islamic 
State campaign during their years of revitalization and growth in Iraq and Syria.  
                                            
37 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, 1st. ed (New York: McGraw-Hill Publ, 
1978). 
38 Abdulkader H. Sinno, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008). 
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E. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis evaluates each component of Islamic State revolutionary 
actions using a variety of publically available reporting sources. Given the 
clandestine nature of revolutionary movements, evidence is challenging to 
acquire. The general public—both in Iraq and Syria, and abroad—are direct and 
indirect participants in contemporary revolutionary events. A stratagem of 
information operations may exist beneath the most obvious surface of public 
data. For this reason, the validity of some evidence sources requires a degree of 
skepticism.  
The assessment of the Islamic State’s actions during the 2011–2014 
period begins with an analysis of revolutionary actions directed at the Iraqi state. 
The second chapter of this thesis uses a database of car bomb attacks as an 
indicator—given their well-documented nature—of the over-arching IS campaign 
of attacks against the state. This quantitative data set is supplemented with 
qualitative analysis that shows three associated conditions of IS attacks. First, 
Islamic State attacks targeted the state directly and indirectly. Directly by using 
violence against security forces and government personnel. Indirectly through 
targeting a population deemed sensitive by the majority government—the Shi’a. 
Second, that the state reacted with indiscriminate violence against the Sunni 
population. This further disenfranchised a segment of the Iraqi population to a 
level sufficient to support revolutionary movements. Third, that Islamic State 
attacks degraded the Iraqi’s governments mechanisms for controlling the 
population. These included the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces and the 
provision of essential services needed to uphold the social contract. Finally, the 
assessment of Islamic State attacks against directed at the state will show such 
actions were of little importance in Syria, given the on-going revolution at the time 
of the movement's entry.  
Chapter III focuses on the Islamic State’s actions directed at competing 
movements. This chapter assesses IS interactions with a variety of other socio-
political organizations in Iraq and Syria. The qualitative data characterizes 
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Islamic State efforts to co-opt competing revolutionary groups and tribal 
organizations with varying degrees of success. Quantitative and qualitative 
analysis describes Islamic State actions to eliminate groups that were unwilling to 
accept co-option. The analysis shows that when IS efforts directed at competing 
movements were not successful, growth was impeded.  
Chapter IV addresses Islamic State actions directed at the population. 
This analysis uses a database of internal Islamic State documents to illuminate 
and evaluate two principle movement goals. First, IS developed multiple, 
overlapping bureaucracies with the intent to control the population. These 
efforts—equally robust and brutal—achieved short-term success. This control 
enabled the Islamic State to pursue its second component of actions, the 
extraction of resources from the population. These resources are essential for 
supporting revolutionary movement growth and obtainment of its objectives. 
Finally, this thesis concludes by assessing the integration of the Islamic 
State’s revolutionary actions across all three subject groups. This analysis will 
illuminate the answer to the fundamental question of the thesis: How did the 
Islamic State recover from the brink of defeat in 2011 to achieve surprising 
success by the end of 2014? By itself, answering this question is of great 
importance. Yet, it also opens the door for better informed analysis in the future. 
This may include better understanding of Islamic State affiliates outside of Iraq 
and Syria, and strategies for countering the movement, wherever it is found. 
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II. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT  
THE STATE 
As discussed during the first chapter, revolutionary actions directed at the 
state serve two purposes—delegitimizing the state and degrading the state’s 
capacity to control the population. These objectives are pursued directly and 
indirectly through the use of violence, as depicted in Figure 2. This chapter 
explains how Islamic State attacks achieved these purposes in Iraq, and why 
such attacks were far less important in Syria. 
State legitimacy has fluid and fixed components.39 An ethnic minority 
ruling an ethnic majority with differing collective values, for example, is a 
relatively fixed condition that has implications on the legitimacy of the state. 
While regime change is the ultimate goal, movements cannot impact the ethnic 
makeup for the state as a means for delegitimizing it to support a revolution. 
Conversely, the performance of the state is fluid. Revolutionary movements can 
provoke the state into actions that are detrimental to its legitimacy. The Islamic 
State directly and indirectly attacked the state to incite indiscriminate reprisals 
against the population. These actions successfully contributed to delegitimizing 
the government in Baghdad. 
                                            
39 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The State’s Legitimacy in 




Figure 2.  Revolutionary Actions Directed at the State 
The second objective is to degrade the state's ability to control the 
population, which provides opportunities for revolutionary movements to grow. 
Islamic State attacks directed at state security institutions directly degraded their 
ability to control the population. Additionally, targeting government administrative 
buildings disrupts the provision of government services. As government services 
break down, so does the social contract. 
This chapter begins with a quantitative and qualitative analysis of Islamic 
State attacks against the state within Iraq. This analysis scrutinizes the use of car 
bombs, as this technique is the most documented and branded form of Islamic 
State attack. This reveals the significant pressure the movement imposed upon 
the state to respond.  
The second portion of analysis featured in this chapter will qualitatively 
evaluate the state’s reaction to IS car bombs. This reveals the state’s reprisals 
were a response to increased levels of Islamic State attacks. These reprisals 
were indiscriminate acts of repression against the Sunni population, and 
accelerated outrage against the Baghdad government.  
The third section of this chapter assesses Islamic State actions directed at 
the state in terms of their disruption of state control mechanisms. Islamic State 
attacks degraded state security institutions, and their ability to enforce the state’s 
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will on the population. These attacks also disrupted the functioning of state 
services, which eroded the social contract. 
The fourth portion of this chapter accounts for evidence that does not 
support the model of revolutionary growth. This evaluates other possible 
explanations of the data, and data that partially contradicts the conclusions. In 
particular, this portion considers state delegitimizing actions that were not a 
response to Islamic State attacks.  
This chapter concludes by evaluating the interaction of a delegitimized 
state and disrupted state control mechanisms. These conditions, shaped in large 
part by the Islamic State, established the circumstances necessary for 
revolutionary movement growth. This manifested in the Sunni uprising and 
Anbar, Nineveh, and other enclaves across Iraq.  
A. EVIDENCE OF ISLAMIC STATE DIRECT AND INDIRECT ATTACKS 
AGAINST THE STATE 
The Islamic State employs a variety of types of attacks, but none are more 
high profile than the car bomb—known in the military lexicon as a Vehicle-Borne 
Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). These attacks are periodically used to 
attack military targets—such as ISF patrols or check points—but are the tool of 
choice for punishing rival population centers. Unlike abductions and subsequent 
extra-judicial killings, car bombs dominate media headlines whenever they occur. 
Thus, they are the most documented form of Islamic State attack.  
This analysis includes two reporting sources for data depicting the Islamic 
State’s employment of the car bombs. The first is the Iraq Body Count, an online 
database that catalogues incidents within Iraq that result in the loss of life. The 
database includes detailed information—pulled from local media outlets— 
including attack weapons used, low and high estimates for casualties, location, 
and time of day. The vast majority of events in the database are vetted by 
multiple sources, with the preponderance of single-source reported events 
consisting of small attacks involving only a few individuals. Given the high-profile 
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nature of car bombs, these are typically well reported by local media agencies—
and accurately portrayed in the Iraq Body Count database.40 Unfortunately, there 
is not a comparable database available for the Syrian conflict. Given this 
limitation, analysis of the use of provocative attacks against the Syrian regime 
can only be qualitative.  
The second main data source is the Islamic State itself. The Islamic State 
has published two annual reports detailing their attacks. These reports cover the 
periods of November 2011 thru November 2012, and November 2012 through 
November 2013.41 The data included within these documents should be treated 
with some degree of skepticism, given the natural incentive for a combatant to 
inflate any representation of their operational capacity. However, the data within 
these documents enumerating the employment of car bombs are generally 
consistent with the trend depicted by the Iraq Body Count database during the 
same timeframe. Interestingly, the Islamic State annual reporting on operations 
only covers provinces within Iraq. By the end of the second reporting period, the 
Islamic State is already active in Syria, but perhaps only to a limited degree that 
would not be beneficial to highlight in a self-generated operational report.42 
Using the reporting periods of the Islamic State annual reports, the Iraq 
Body Count indicates 203 and 541 car bomb attacks from November 2011 
through November 2012 and November 2012 through November 2013 
respectively.43 The Islamic State claimed 252 and 615 car bomb operations 
                                            
40 Iraq Body Count, “The Iraq Body Count Incidents Database” (London, UK, March 3, 2016), 
https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/. 
41 Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal a Metrics-Driven Military Command” (The 
Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014), 
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISWBackgrounder_ISIS_Annual_Reports_0.p
df. 
42 The Carter Center, “Syria Countrywide Conflict Report #1” (Atlanta, GA, August 20, 2013), 
http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-
conflict/NationwideReport_aug-20–2013.pdf. 
43 Iraq Body Count, “Incidents Database.” 
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during these periods.44 It is possible the difference between data sets stems from 
differences in the unit of measure—events resulting in casualties for the Iraq 
Body Count Data base and operations for the Islamic State’s publications. 
Ostensibly, “operations” may include attempted car bomb attacks that failed to 
detonate or were otherwise aborted. Both are events that would not result in 
casualties and would not be included in the casualty database. Despite the unit 
of measure differences, and the previously mentioned incentive to inflate 
operational statistics, both data sets show a greater than two-fold increase in car 
bomb attacks within Iraq.  
During the calendar years 2011 through 2013, the casualty database 
shows a steady increase in car bomb attacks, with some fluctuation in attack 
frequency from month to month. During 2011, car bombings occurred at an 
average rate of 8.25 attacks per month. In 2012, this number more than doubled 
to a rate of 18.67 attacks per month. The frequency of car bombings increased 
further yet in 2013, when the average reached 46.25 car bomb attacks per 
month. Amazingly, from July through October of 2013, the Islamic State 
conducted nearly 70 car bomb attacks per month—the peak of their car bomb 
operations. Subsequently, car bombings decreased in frequency during 2014. 
Complete annual data for IS car bombs and casualties is depicted in Table 1.45  
Table 1.   Islamic State Car Bomb Attacks 
 
In addition to a vehicle, a car bomb requires a driver (suicide or 
otherwise), explosives, an initiation system, facilities for construction, and 
                                            
44 Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal.”  
45 Iraq Body Count, “Incidents Database.” 
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potentially—depending on the size of the payload—reinforced suspension or 
other mechanical enhancements. Even when considering the costs of vehicle 
procurement alone—through either legitimate or illegitimate means—maintaining 
a pace of over 45 car bomb attacks per month during 2013 is a substantial 
undertaking. While the specifics of the Islamic State’s organizational dimensions 
are not publically available, the operational tempo suggests the organization 
committed a significant portion of its enterprise to the conduct of car bomb 
operations.  
This data shows that attacks targeting the state were a significantly 
important aspect of the Islamic State’s campaign during the 2011–2014 
timeframe. Reviewing the targets of the Islamic State attacks, the database 
shows there are two major categories. The first is that Islamic State car bombs 
are frequently used for attacking Iraqi Security Forces and government facilities. 
The second grouping is that IS car bombs target Shia population centers. The 
overwhelming majority of attacks fall into these categories. Attacks against 
Kurdish forces and population centers are a distant third most frequent 
occurrence.46  
The employment of car bombs against ISF targets is a clear attempt to 
directly attack the state. Targeting Shiite population centers—such as the Sadr 
City district of Baghdad, Karbala, or Najaf—is an attempt to indirectly attack the 
state. The Baghdad government’s base of support stems from the predominately 
Shiite population centers. Protecting these regions, and satisfying the security 
needs for their inhabitants, is essential to the political survival of the al-Maliki 
regime.47 Thus, an attack on these population centers is an indirect attack on the 
state. Direct and indirect attacks provoke the state to react using the means 
available, and this response is evaluated in the following section.  
                                            
46 Iraq Body Count, “Incidents Database.” 
47 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ed., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2005). 
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Abu Musab al-Zarqawi introduced punishing the Shia as a strategy of 
provocation as part of the Islamic State's heritage. In a personal letter to senior Al 
Qaeda leadership written in early 2004, Zarqawi describes his scheme regarding 
the Shia:  
These in our opinion are the key to change: I mean that targeting 
and hitting them in their religious, political, and military depth will 
provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of 
the hidden rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in 
dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become 
possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent 
danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans.48 
The Islamic State car bomb campaign during the 2011–2014 timeframe is 
consistent with Zarqawi's vision. These attacks purposely sought to incite 
reprisals against the Sunnis as a means for generating revolutionary motivation.  
Within Syria, a lack of significant reports of Islamic State attacks against 
the state also support the revolutionary growth model. Although there is reporting 
that the Islamic State has employed car bombs in Syria, such reporting is 
sparse—and suggests the target is not the state.49 Islamic State efforts in Syria 
are largely limited by rival movements, and not the Assad regime in Damascus. 
In fact, some reports indicate the Islamic State and the Syrian regime operate 
with a degree of coordination.50 Given this strategy, it is logical that provocative 
attacks directed at the state are less important. 
                                            
48 “February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English Translation of Terrorist Musab Al 
Zarqawi Letter Obtained by United States Government in Iraq.,” February 2004, U.S. Department 
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49 Tariq al-Abd, “Fighters in Eastern Ghouda: ISIS Blows up Car in Duma,” Al-Safir, June 17, 
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50 Stuart Ramsay, “IS Files Reveal Assad’s Deals with Militants,” Sky News, May 3, 2016, 
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B. EVIDENCE OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ISLAMIC 
STATE ATTACKS. 
As the Islamic State directly and indirectly attacked the Iraqi government, 
the state responded in kind. This section reviews a series of Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) attacks directed at the Islamic State. These attacks may be characterized 
as indiscriminate responses to the Islamic State.  
Eventually, al-Maliki would name his campaign against the Islamic State 
Revenge of the Martyrs—a clear indication that ISF operations were a reaction to 
direct and indirect attacks on the state.51 A Shiite parliamentary member, Awad 
al-Awadi of the Sadr Trend, would describe the announcement in August 2013 as 
overdue, and acknowledged the government’s responsibility to respond to the 
Islamic State attacks.52 Following previous IS bombings in September 2012,53 
and March, 2013,54 Shia residents would call the Baghdad government 
“shameful” for allowing the attacks to occur. This indicates the ISF attacks 
described in this section were a response to IS attacks—showing Islamic State 
efforts to provoke the state were successful.  
On 25 January 2013, Iraqi Security Forces fired upon Sunni 
demonstrators in Fallujah, resulting in four killed and 42 wounded. Witnesses 
claim that the shootings occurred after unarmed protestors began throwing 
objects at the ISF members. Prime Minister al-Maliki blamed the incident on 
“regional conspiracies”—a likely reference to the Islamic State.55 The event also 
                                            
51 “Aid Sought for ‘Revenge of the Martyrs,’” Associated Press, September 19, 2013, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/middle-east/9184546/Aid-sought-for-Revenge-of-the-Martyrs. 
52 Ahmed Hussein, “Sadrist MP Describes Revenge for Martyrs Security Operation as ‘Late,’” 
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53 “Bombings across Iraq Kill 26,” The Guardian, September 30, 2012, 
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54 Mohammed Tawfeeq, “18 Killed as Car Bombs Target Shiite Worshipers in Iraq,” CNN, 
March 29, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/29/world/iraq-violence/. 
55 Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Officials: Iraqi Soldiers Fire on Anti-Government Protesters,” CNN, 
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occurred following a year of escalated Sunni violence targeting predominantly 
Shia populations and security forces. Car bombings more than doubled in 2012 
from the previous year, increasing the pressure on the ISF to act in defense of 
both Iraqi civilians and their own military formations.56  
This event, known as the “Friday of No Return,” marked an increase in the 
degree of disenfranchisement of the Sunni population. In the week following the 
first ISF attack on Sunni Protestors, protest leaders formed popular committees 
to secure the protest sites.57 Sunni Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha voiced demands 
for al-Maliki to deliver the ISF soldiers responsible for the Friday of No Return 
shooting, or face violence. His echoes the sentiments of the protests, which 
champion the repeal of the de-baathification law.58 Abu Risha is an influential 
Sunni and leader of the Anbar Awakening Council that played a significant role in 
sidelining the Islamic State prior to the departure of U.S. Forces.59 Abu Risha’s 
demands—although threatening to the al-Maliki government—seek to obtain a 
political solution to the turmoil. Making a stronger call to arms, the Islamic State 
urged Sunnis to take up arms and overthrow the Shiite government in a 
1 February statement.60 Conversely, Sunni cleric Abdul-Hameed Jadoua urged 
the masses to not give in to zeal, and follow the responsible guidance to tribal 
leaders.61 Based on the statements of Sunni leaders, it appears the ISF 
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crackdown in Fallujah on 25 January was marked point for Iraqi Sunnis. The 
attack delegitimized the state, and some began to discuss violence as a possible 
option—even if most remained against the notion of renewed violence.  
Three months later, the Iraqi Security Forces increased pressure on the 
Sunni protest sites. In the province of Kirkuk, ISF elements surrounded Sunni 
protestors in the village of Hawija. On 23 April, 2013, the confrontation boiled 
over into violence—resulting in the death of 39 civilians and over 100 others 
wounded. Sunni protestors and Iraqi Security Forces would blame each other for 
instigating the violence.62  
The ISF operation on in Hawijah further pushed the Sunni protest 
movement towards violence. In Ramadi, Sunni leaders announced the formation 
of the Army of Pride and Dignity on 26 April, taking another step towards violent 
conflict.63 Despite this escalation, and a few small confrontations between militia 
members and ISF formations, Sunni leaders continued to push for a political 
solution.64 Sheikh Abdul Malik al-Saadi was chosen to lead a commission 
charged with negotiating with the Baghdad government, as a means to obtain 
Sunni protest objectives through political means.65 Tensions remained 
heightened, but the onset of any systemic violence between the Sunni population 
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and ISF formations was curtailed for the time.66 The ISF operation in Hawija—
and second major indiscriminate response to Islamic State attacks—clearly 
eroded the legitimacy of the Iraqi state even further.  
The third major act of violent repression occurred in Ramadi at the end of 
2013. During a 22 December speech—a day after an Islamic State operation 
resulted in the death of an Iraqi General—al-Maliki implied the Sunni protest sites 
were harboring terrorists.67 These comments were met with defiance from 
protest leaders in Ramadi, who stated that protestors would arm themselves and 
defend the protest site from any ISF operation.68 On 30 December, ISF 
formations displaced Ramadi protestors, killing 14 and wounded many others. 
Unlike the violence in Fallujah that began the year, groups of armed Sunnis 
exchanged gunfire with ISF formations. Additionally, ISF units raided the home of 
parliamentary member Ahmed al-Alwani, detaining him and killing his brother. 69 
The crackdown on the protest center in Ramadi was a final act of repression from 
the Government of Iraq, transitioning into a period of open conflict between Sunni 
organizations and Iraqi Security Forces.  
Perhaps al-Maliki recognized the critical error the Iraqi Security Forces 
made, as he ordered their immediate withdrawal from the city.70 However, a final 
line was crossed. On 5 January, the Military Council of Anbar emerged and 
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openly engaged ISF formations. Despite their division with the Islamic State, the 
Military Council of Anbar’s operations against the Iraqi Security Forces obscured 
the differences between the tribal force and the revolutionary movement.71  
As violence escalated, the Iraqi Security Forces continued the trend of 
indiscriminate attacks. Reporting from within the Iraqi military surfaced stating the 
ISF employed indirect fire against the Fallujah hospital. From January through 
the end of May 2014, sixteen different attacks against the hospital occurred using 
mortars and artillery. This was corroborated by Hospital employees and residents 
in the area. Additionally, other residents would report Iraqi military helicopters 
dropping unguided barrel bombs in Fallujah’s neighborhoods. These reports 
were corroborated by an Anbar security official, who characterized the ISF 
operation in Fallujah as an effort to destroy the city, and not eliminate terrorists.72  
In 2013 and early 2014, the Iraqi Security Forces sought to strike back 
against the Islamic State. Under pressure to respond to frequent car bomb 
attacks against Shia neighborhoods and frustrated by their own casualties, the 
ISF failed to discriminate between IS revolutionary and frustrated civilian. This 
had regrettable results for the state, as Sunni populations rejected the Baghdad 
government as an illegitimate authority. The Islamic State attacks were effective 
in provoking the state, and Sunni motivation for revolution followed.  
C. EVIDENCE OF ISLAMIC STATE ATTACKS DISRUPTING 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL MECHANISMS 
During the 2011–2014 timeframe, The Islamic State conducted many 
actions intended to disrupt state control. These actions may be sorted into three 
categories: attacks targeting government figures and facilities, attacks targeting 
the Iraqi Security Forces, and attacks targeting the Iraqi prison system. While IS 
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attacks targeting political figures and facilities occur during the entire 2012–2014 
period, the latter two efforts were part of sequential Islamic State campaigns. The 
Breaking the Walls campaign targeted several incarceration facilities starting in 
July of 2012.73 The following July, the Islamic State announced the Harvest the 
Soldiers campaign that subsequently focused on the Iraqi Security Forces.74 
These attacks degraded state security institutions, and disrupted state services. 
Together, these actions disrupted the state’s ability to control the population.  
Targeting Iraqi government facilities disrupted the provision of government 
services. In early April, 2013, the Islamic State targeted government 
administrative facilities in Tikrit. Attackers detonated a truck laden with explosives 
within the compound, yet an assessment of damages was not reported.75 In 
September, the Islamic State attacked the municipal building in Hawija, Kirkuk. 
Seven government civilians and three Iraqi Army soldiers were killed, with 22 
others wounded.76  
Violence against government figures would escalate dramatically by years 
end. In June of 2013, a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Dawa Party 
was assassinated near Mosul by unidentified individuals.77 By year’s end, single 
instances of political violence were no longer making headlines. In December of 
2013, government administrative staffs were reporting to the media that the 
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Islamic State was paralyzing state departments. During October and November, 
approximately 80 government administrators in Mosul were killed by the Islamic 
State.78 
The Iraq Body Count estimates between 360 and 546 civilians associated 
with the provision of state administration were killed between 2011 and 2014. 
This estimate excludes tribal leaders who fulfill informal positions within the 
state.79 Countless others received death threats that may have resulted in 
absenteeism or other administrative disruptions.80 The accuracy of the database 
is limited by the target description, as individuals who were targeted because of 
their affiliation with the government are not necessarily recorded as such. For this 
reason, the database range is likely an underestimation of the actual figure. 
Regardless, it is fair to conclude the Islamic State conducted many actions 
directed at disrupting government functionality. With substantial numbers of 
government workers killed—and countless others hiding or otherwise 
ineffective—the social contract between the state and the population was 
stressed. 
The first named campaign under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—Breaking the 
Walls—sought to undermine the Iraqi prison system. During this effort, the 
Islamic State conducted six major attacks against state prisons, seeking to free 
hundreds of Islamic State members from state control. Three of these attacks 
targeted the Camp Taji facility north of Baghdad, in August of 2012, February of 
2013, and July of 2013. All of these attempts were unsuccessful, but incurred 
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many ISF casualties.81 Another failed prison break occurred in February, when 
the Islamic State targeted the prison facility in Kirkuk, Iraq. Reports suggest that 
over 130 ISF casualties were sustained during the attack, yet the Islamic State 
was ultimately unable to free any incarcerated individuals.82  
There were two instances of the Islamic State successfully emptying a 
prison. In September 2012, IS attacked the Tasfirat Prison in Tikrit, resulting in 
90 militants freed. During the attack, 12 ISF were killed, and the Islamic State 
destroyed the prison rosters. Government representatives reported that this 
measure prevented the state from being able to track down the freed 
individuals.83 The Islamic State later claimed the attack through their official 
media outlet, reporting they freed 30 movement members during the operation.84 
The most successful attack on an Iraqi prison occurred on 22 July 2013, 
and marked the end of the Breaking the Walls campaign. This operation is 
believed to have freed between 500 and 1,000 inmates from the Abu Ghraib 
prison west of Baghdad. The Iraqi government has not made an official 
statement regarding the scope of the prison break, and some media outlets 
reported over 3,000 inmates were freed.85 
The inability to secure detainees is a significant issue for the Iraqi state. 
Beyond the proximate issue of Islamic State members returning to operations, 
there are two second-order negative effects. The inability to keep convicted 
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revolutionaries in prison degrades the population’s assessment of the state’s 
control, giving the perception that a revolutionary movement has a greater 
chance to succeed. Secondly, prison breaks demoralize security forces and lead 
to extra-judicial killings. Military and police forces who believe captured 
revolutionaries may escape easily are more likely to take justice into their own 
hands. This would cause these security forces to lose credibility with the 
population.  
The second Islamic State campaign—Harvest the Soldiers—began 
following the Abu Ghraib prison raid. The Islamic State shifted focus from prisons 
to Iraqi Security Forces leadership, targeting headquarters facilities and officers. 
In September, the Islamic State attacked the Tahadi police headquarters in 
southern Fallujah, killing six policemen but failing to seriously disrupt 
operations.86 In October, the Islamic State targeted the National Police 
headquarters in Babil. The attack featured multiple car bombs, and resulted in 7 
national policemen killed.87 Also in October, the Islamic State targeted the 
Nineveh Operations Headquarters with car bombs, resulting in 14 ISF 
casualties.88 
In general, Iraqi Security Forces experienced a significant increase in 
casualties during the Harvest the Soldiers campaign. From August 2013 through 
the start of June 2014, the Iraq Body Count database estimates between 1,046 
and 1,255 ISF members died as a result from hostile fire. During the complete 
year of the Breaking the Walls campaign, the database reflects between 357 and 
382 casualties. As identified previously with IS car bomb operations, the 
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database may be off in magnitude, but its consistency should capture an 
accurate upward trend after August 2013.89  
Based on attack data, it appears the Islamic State conducted a significant 
number of attacks to directly disrupt state control mechanisms in Iraq. 
Revolutionary actions directed at government agencies to disrupt control of the 
security forces and provision of state services, the disruption of the state’s ability 
to incarcerate known movement members, and the attrition of the security forces 
themselves, all eroded Baghdad’s control over Sunni population centers. The 
Islamic State contributed to their successful outcome by using revolutionary 
actions to disrupt state control through attrition.  
D. EVIDENCE NOT SUPPORTING THE REVOLUTIONARY GROWTH 
MODEL 
The issue of attribution may potentially complicate the analysis of Islamic 
State actions targeting the state. As discussed previously, the Islamic State 
annual reports seem to parallel the Iraq Body Count database. However, the 
Islamic State is not the only Sunni-based movement in Iraq that is targeting the 
state. It is feasible that other revolutionary movements are conducting similar car 
bomb attacks within Iraq, and that the Islamic State is claiming these as a means 
to increase their perceived strength. These attacks are designed to encourage 
reprisals that delegitimize the state. If the population begins to view the 
incumbent government as illegitimate, this is to the benefit of all revolutionary 
movements—not just the movement responsible for the provoking attacks. The 
delegitimized state becomes a form of club good shared among the revolutionary 
movements.  
Other evidence may actually impede any conclusions that suggest a 
causal relationship between revolutionary actions, state repression, and the 
subsequent disenfranchisement of the population. Such evidence would include 
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actions undertaken by the state that alienate the population that were not in 
response to revolutionary actions. Self-induced political failures might suggest 
the beginnings of revolutionary opportunity are more about poor state 
performance than movement actions.  
Two state actions that are difficult to identify as responses to Islamic State 
car bombs, yet generated significant blowback among the Sunni population, were 
the arrest of two significant Sunni politicians. The first of these occurred on 15 
December, 2011, just one day after the end of the U.S. Military operation. The 
Government of Iraq issued an arrest warrant for Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi 
and detained ten members of his body guard detail under the Accountability and 
Justice Act laws—also known as de-Baathification laws. Three of the detained 
guards issued nationally-televised confessions acknowledging their participation 
in assassination efforts on behalf of al-Hashimi, the senior Sunni member of the 
Iraqi Government.90 These charges were staunchly denied by al-Hashimi—who 
abstained from signing the Law in 200891—and raised the suspicions of Iraqi 
Sunnis.92 Three months after the detention of the security detail, one of al-
Hashimi’s guards died in prison. Amir al-Batawi’s body indicated he was burned 
and tortured in other ways. It was clear to some the televised confessions were 
the result of significant coercion from the ISF.93 This event occurred following a 
period of few car bombs, averaging less than 8 attacks per month over the 120-
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day period leading up to the arrest.94 Given that it predates the rise in car bomb 
activity, it is difficult to conclude this arrest is a result of Islamic State actions. 
On 21 December, 2012, the Government of Iraq pursued another senior 
Sunni official. Approximately 150 members of Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s 
staff and security detail were arrested on terrorism charges. Prime Minister Nuri 
al-Maliki, a Shiite, previously suspected al-Issawi of links to the Sunni 
insurgency, suspicions that U.S. forces investigated and determined to be false. 
Furthermore, the arrest occurred while Jalal Talabani—the influential Kurd and 
mediator between Sunni and Shiite leaders in Baghdad—was out of the country 
for medical reasons.95 Following the detention of al-Issawi’s staff and security 
detail, widespread protests occurred in Sunni population centers across Iraq.96  
The only public evidence against the Sunni politicians was the—
potentially—coerced confessions from associates. This leaves the validity of the 
arrest warrants open to interpretation, and the court of Sunni public opinion 
clearly viewed the actions as illegitimate. It is inappropriate to conclude these two 
actions were a reaction to an escalation of Islamic State attacks against Shia 
entities. It is more likely that al-Maliki viewed al-Hashimi and al-Issawi as political 
rivals, and not actual terrorist threats.97 These two arrests suggest that the 
delegitimizing actions of the Iraqi government may not have stemmed entirely as 
a response to IS attacks.  
The Islamic State’s use of attacks against the state appears to be an 
effective contributor to the negative Sunni perception of the state in Iraq. IS car 
bombs supported the provocation of Iraqi Security Forces operations that 
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incurred significant collateral damage. However, these actions are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to create revolutionary opportunity. Syria would suggest 
they are not necessary, given a precondition of a disenfranchised population. 
Sufficiency is also unknown, given the environment of other concurrent 
activities—such as political gamesmanship—that contributed to the Sunni 
population’s disenfranchisement.  
Revolutionary actions directed at the state to disrupt the incumbent 
government’s control over the population are difficult to assess. In order to reach 
definitive conclusions, one would need assessments of security institutions prior 
to the conduct of revolutionary actions, with a subsequent evaluation after some 
period of time to contrast the net change. One independent assessment of Iraqi 
military forces following the U.S. withdrawal revealed a significant degree of 
uncertainty in assessing the ISF, a force to which western militaries no longer 
maintained significant access.98  
There were other indications the Iraqi Security Forces were unable to 
unilaterally assume responsibility for state security upon the U.S. exodus. 
Lieutenant General Babaker Zebari, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Military, offered a 
bleak assessment of his nation’s security forces following the end of the U.S. 
training mission in Iraq. He anticipated that Iraq would not be able to fully secure 
itself until after 2020, leaving a nine-year period when the state would be left 
exposed.99 The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGAR) 
concurred with this assessment, offering that Iraqi ground forces lacked the 
necessary logistics capabilities that are required for sustaining their military 
capacity after the U.S. withdrawal.100  
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 Given this bleak assessment at the end of 2011, an argument can be 
made that the Iraqi Security Forces were destined to fail even without a 
sustained campaign of Islamic State attacks. Such a counter-factual theory would 
be impossible to prove or disprove, but it does suggest a measure of uncertainty 
to the degree to which the Islamic State was responsible for its own success. 
E. CONCLUSIONS ON ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS 
DIRECTED AT THE STATE  
The actions of the Islamic State directed against the Baghdad government 
are largely explained by the model of revolutionary growth. The first section of 
this chapter illustrates the Islamic State’s direct and indirect attacks against the 
state. These attacks targeted the ISF and sensitive population centers, and 
steadily increased until early 2014. In 2014, these attacks became less frequent, 
as they achieved their purpose—provoking the state into indiscriminate violence 
and disrupting state control.  
ISF operations targeting the Islamic State failed to differentiate between 
members of the revolutionary movement and the Sunni population. This provided 
gasoline upon the embers of unrest in Anbar, Nineveh, and other Sunni majority 
regions of Iraq. Concurrently, Islamic State attacks also degraded the capacity of 
the state security apparatus, and disrupted the provision of state services. While 
the indiscriminate violent reprisals of the ISF provided motivation for revolution, 
the disruption of state control mechanisms provided the opportunity for it to 
occur.  
While alternative explanations are possible, given the political errors of al-
Maliki and the lack of capability in the ISF—these do not sufficiently explain the 
onset armed resistance in Sunni regions. Based on the available evidence, the 
Islamic State’s actions directed at the Baghdad government were necessary for 
the rapid deterioration of stability in Iraq.  
Furthermore, the onset of a variety of other movements—such as the 
Army of Pride & Dignity and the Military Council of Anbar—reinforce the validity 
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of the first component of the revolutionary growth model. The revolutionary 
actions described in this chapter foster the desire for change, and the opportunity 
to do so. These conditions facilitate revolutionary movement growth, as the 
appearance of the aforementioned additional movements validates.  
In Syria, the absence of Islamic State attacks directed at the State 
appears consistent with the revolutionary growth model. The purpose of actions 
directed at the state is to facilitate conditions for revolutionary growth. Within 
Syria, these conditions are exceedingly present when the Islamic State initiates 
its campaign there in early 2013. Evidence of a significant number of IS attacks 
against the Syrian regime would suggest their purpose was something other than 
delegitimizing the state and degrading state control.  
Finally, this chapter shows that revolutionary actions directed at the 
state—without addressing the population or competing movements—is an 
incomplete strategy. The onset of revolutionary motivation and opportunity are 
club goods—share by many movements competing to reshape the state in their 
image. Given this contest, movements should take revolutionary actions directed 




III. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT  
COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
The second category of revolutionary actions are those directed at 
competing movements. Established theory indicates revolutionary movements 
conduct these actions to either co-opt or eliminate rival movements in order to 
establish a monopoly over population control, as depicted in Figure 3. This would 
predict that IS might seek to establish alliances with other revolutionary 
movements and tribes, even those with different ideologies or desired goals. The 
Islamic State might use brokers to recruit individuals and groups from these 
entities. Those movements and tribes the Islamic State is unable to co-opt, might 
then be targeted for elimination.  
 
Figure 3.  Revolutionary Actions Directed at Competing Movements 
The Islamic State performed actions directed at competing movements 
and tribes in both Iraq and Syria. Organizations that were not effectively co-opted 
were targeted for elimination in both states. Where the Islamic State was able to 
accomplish either co-option or elimination of competing movements—and where 
the state was also delegitimized and weakened—IS was able to pursue the third 
category of revolutionary actions, population control.  
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A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS TO CO-OPT COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
Within Iraq, the brutality and dominance of the Islamic State makes other 
Sunni insurgent groups easy to overlook. Portraying the Sunni insurgency as a 
single movement is an oversimplification that overlooks differences in objectives 
and ideologies between groups. IS took serious measures to co-opt these 
organizations to support its own efforts.  
One competing group was the Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI). IAI was a Sunni 
populist movement that was seeking the formation of fully federated areas within 
Iraq. The movement desires a three-state solution with shared economic 
resources.101 However, during the Sunni Awakening, IAI joined the Sahwa in 
support of the central government. During the onset of Sunni revolt in 2013, IAI 
defected from the Sahwa and returned as a revolutionary movement.102 The IAI 
founder and commander, Sheikh Ahmed al-Dabash acknowledged in June of 
2014 that his forces were fighting with the Islamic State. He publically recognized 
that the ideological differences between their organizations were less important 
than the need to defeat a common enemy of occupation—be it American or 
Iranian. Al-Dabash also publically stated that eventually, after Sunni forces retake 
Baghdad, his organization will need to fight and defeat the Islamic State.103 Until 
then, both organizations appeared to be placing the common enemy ahead of 
ideological matters.  
 Another competing movement that aligned itself with the Islamic State 
was the Jaysh al-Mujahideen (JM). JM sought to overthrow the regime and 
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revitalize Sunni rule over all of Iraq. Like IAI, Jaysh al-Mujahideen has placed the 
common enemy as a priority over ideological preference, as indicated by social 
media statements in early 2014. The movement worked with both tribal leaders 
and insurgent groups to defeat the “Persian” enemy.104 
Both IAI and JM are likely victims of manipulation by the Islamic State. A 
statement from the Fallujah Military Council in May of 2014 urged the greater 
armed Sunni insurgency to focus on defeating the Iraqi Security Forces, and not 
consolidating control among the rebels. The Fallujah Military Council represents 
a conglomerate of groups who, at the time, split control of the city with the Islamic 
State. JM also reported IS co-option efforts during the fighting near al-Karma, 
where JM bore the brunt of dislodging the Iraqi Security Forces and the Islamic 
State subsequently consolidated the gains.105 These statements show the 
Islamic State was actively focused on co-opting movements and allowing them to 
take on a greater share of the struggle against government forces.  
The Islamic State also employed the same approach with Jaysh Rijal al-
Tariqa al-Naqshbandi (JRTN). JRTN is a Ba’athist movement, one that has 
constantly adapted to changing dynamics within the Sunni insurgency.106 In 
January of 2013, JRTN seized the Fallujah Dam, only to subsequently lose 
control of the area to the Islamic State.107 Evidence shows JRTN and the Islamic 
State taking a pragmatic approach to their respective relations. The Twitter 
account “@wikibaghdady” revealed insider details regarding the Islamic State’s 
interactions with rival groups. While the authenticity is questionable, it offers a 
                                            
104 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Interview with the Leader of Iraq’s Jaysh Al-Mujahideen: Abd 
Al-Hakim Al-Nuaimi,” March 17, 2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14605/interview-with-the-
leader-of-iraq-jaysh-al. 
105 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Key Updates on Iraq’s Sunni Insurgent Groups,” May 11, 
2014, http://www.aymennjawad.org/14755/key-updates-on-iraq-sunni-insurgent-groups. 
106 Michael Knights, “The JRTN Movement and Iraq’s Next Insurgency,” CTC Sentinel, July 
1, 2011, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-jrtn-movement-and-iraq%E2%80%99s-next-
insurgency. 
107 Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, “Key Updates on Iraq’s Sunni Insurgent Groups.” 
 42
unique purview into the Islamic State activities.108 Whomever is behind the 
account, they revealed discussions between senior representatives on the 
Islamic State and Ibrahim Izzat al-Duri—the head of JRTN. What is revealed is 
an agreement for JRTN to support the Islamic State in exchange for placing Iraqi 
Ba’athists into senior positions of responsibility within controlled territory in Iraq. 
Furthermore, JRTN asks that foreign fighters constitute no more than 20% of 
mid-level leadership positions.109  
Within Syria, the Islamic State was able to co-opt fewer competing 
movements. One movement IS successfully co-opted was the Yarmouk Martyrs 
Brigade (YMB). This movement began in 2012 as a secular organization, and 
established recognition for itself by the spring of 2013. The YMB played an 
important role in the assault on Syrian Arab Army’s 38th Division base, during 
which the movement coordinated efforts with Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN). By the 
following summer, YMB was adopting Islamic State insignia and supporting it 
with its struggle against JN. Of note, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade clashed 
openly with al-Nusrah affiliated organizations in December at the behest of the 
Islamic State.110  
Interestingly, YMB operates in southwestern Dera’a province in Syria, a 
location which has never been contiguously joined with the Islamic State. Other 
movements in the region were the first to make public the alliance between IS 
and YMB. Their communications have remained secret, although it is likely 
individuals with access to both YMB and IS-controlled regions are facilitating the 
partnership. Interestingly, Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade members have since revised 
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their organizational history to conform to IS ideology—denying its having ever 
been a secular revolutionary movement.111 With the exception of YMB, co-opting 
competing movements has been a difficult undertaking for the Islamic State in 
Syria.  
Tribal organizations can also function like competing movements. The 
Islamic State was able to shore up support among tribal leaders in Syria and 
Iraq. IS learned during the Zarqawi years the dangers of alienating tribes, a 
decision that provided motivation and opportunity for the Sahwa movement to 
gain widespread support.112 The Islamic State, learning from its previous errors, 
engaged with these organizations as if they were competing movements.  
Internal Islamic State documents seized following the death of Haji Bakr 
indicate some of the methods of the organization’s activities. While the files are 
not publicly available in their entirety, the documents Der Spiegel has disclosed 
reveal some specifics of Islamic State’s tribal program. Specifically, the 
information deemed critical by the Islamic State is revealing of the direction of 
their tribal manipulation. The Islamic State dispatched agents to surreptitiously 
gather information on the important leaders within the tribal structure. The agents 
sought to identify their sources of income, their personal habits, which mosques 
they attended, and which rival insurgent groups—if any—with whom they 
associated. Answering these intelligence requirements enabled the Islamic State 
to encourage tribal support through manipulating their leaders. In addition to their 
efforts directed at tribal leaders, the Haji Bakr documents reveal that the Islamic 
State sought to integrate into the tribal structures through marriage.113 
Establishing familial ties—using brokers who forge permanent bonds—to 
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important tribes provides another avenue through which IS was able to solidify 
local support.  
In Iraq in 2013 and early 2014, the Islamic State was able to overcome 
negative tribal inertia from previous years. Following the ISF crackdown in Hawija 
in April of 2013, tribes in Anbar captured and delivered 16 Islamic State members 
to Iraqi Security Forces.114 In the months that followed, the Islamic State 
circulated leaflets across Sunni populations encouraging tribal support.115 In 
November, a tribal sheikh—presumably unwilling to cooperate with the Islamic 
State—was shot in front of his home.116 At the end of 2013, violence was 
erupting between the Islamic State and some tribal groups, but momentum was 
beginning to swing in the movements favor. On 1 January  2014, Anbar 
Chairman Falih al-Issawi made a public statement revealing the Islamic State 
had successfully made agreements with some of the Anbar tribes.117 By April of 
2014, images of Islamic State tribal meetings were appearing on social media, 
and tribal opposition had waned.118 
In Syria, tribes would provide a medium for the Islamic State to garner 
support in the face of the movement's inability to co-opt competing revolutionary 
movements. Beginning with the al-Breij tribe, the Islamic State shored up 
allegiances in the north of Syria. Syrian tribal dynamics in this region differed 
from those in Iraq. Previously, Sunni tribal leaders in the vicinity of Aleppo and 
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Raqqa appeased the Assad regime to garner political and financial support. With 
Assad clearly out of favor among the Sunnis in Syria, tribal leaders were seeking 
new political allies. After garnering the backing of the al-Breij tribal leaders, the 
Islamic State received pledges of support—Bayah—from 10 other tribes in 
northern Syria.119 Tribal support for the Islamic State in Syria correlates to 
regions of IS growth, which suggests co-opting tribal movements offers a viable 
alternative when co-opting revolutionary movements fails. The co-option of tribes 
then supports the elimination of competing movements. 
B. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS TO ELIMINATE COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
When co-option was not feasible, the Islamic State eliminated competing 
movements. Eliminating competing movements—in this case rival movements—
is costlier than co-option, but still achieves monopoly over the population. Within 
Iraq, the Awakening Movement represented a significant obstacle to IS growth.  
After the death of Zarqawi in 2006, the Islamic State evolved into the 
Mujahideen Shura Council—for the military arm—and the Islamic State of Iraq. 
During this time frame, the organization alienated many important socio-political 
organizations within the Sunni regions of Iraq. This alienation provided motivation 
for the development of the Sahwa movement.120 The Islamic State (then Islamic 
State of Iraq) recognized the significance of the Sahwa threat—the movement 
was recruiting from the same population segment, and provided Sunnis with the 
opportunity for armed local self-defense with a degree of government 
sponsorship.121 The movement represented a major obstacle for the Islamic 
State to overcome, as the Sahwa reached roughly 80,000 members at its peak. 
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Yet, the Government of Iraq allowed the movement to atrophy in the years 
following the decline of sectarian violence.122 The apathy toward the Sunni grass 
roots movement provided the Islamic State with an opportunity to roll back the 
Sahwa’s victories.  
The Iraq Body Count can provide a gage of Islamic State efforts to defeat 
the Sahwa. Unlike headline-grabbing car bombings in major population centers, 
attacks against the Sahwa are far less spectacular, and garner less media 
interest. The lack of media coverage degrades the efficacy of the database for 
analyzing the magnitude of small-scale clandestine attacks. However, the issues 
impacting media reporting on attacks against the Sahwa is constant over time, 
giving credibility to changes in attack trends, even if the trends differ from reality 
by orders of magnitude. Table 2 shows numerical data for attacks that contained 
a variety of aliases for Sahwa in the target description. 123 While it is likely the 
actual number of attacks and casualties is far greater, the database shows a 
significant increase in attacks in 2013 and 2014. This spike in violence directed 
at the Sahwa begins in December of 2012, after three months that averaged 8 
attacks. Following December of 2012, the pace of reported attacks against the 
Sahwa continues to climb until the Mosul Offensive in June 2014, when chaos 
significantly disrupted media reporting124 It is not possible to determine the 
degree of attrition due to attacks on the Sahwa, but there is a clear increase in 
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Table 2.   Islamic State Attacks on the Sahwa 
 
 
The Islamic State also used positive incentives to eliminate the Sahwa 
movement. Of the roughly 80,000 Sahwa members recruited and employed 
during the U.S. mission in Iraq—all of whom promised assimilation into Iraqi 
Security Forces and steady pay—only roughly 20,000 Sahwa members 
continued to receive salaries from the Maliki government. The 60,000 odd armed 
militiamen were extremely vulnerable to the financial draw of the Islamic State. 
Even those Sahwa members who were fortunate enough to receive government 
salaries were vulnerable. IS was reportedly offering $400 USD per month to 
Sahwa members who were on the government’s pay roll, a sizeable pay raise for 
an individual collective roughly $300 USD per month from the Ministry of 
Interior.125  
The positive and negative incentives directed at the Sahwa movement 
made an undeterminable impact on the organization. What is clear is the 
movement experienced significant struggles in 2013. In February, Wissam al-
Hardan was designated as the new president of the Sahwa, replacing Ahmed 
Abu Risha who was implicated by the Maliki government for his participation in 
Anbar protest demonstrations. In June of 2013, tribal leaders in Anbar and 
Karbala announced the formation of a new awakening organization—reportedly 
equipped with new weapons and equipment—to address the rising terrorist 
threat. The new organization was designated the “Desert Falcons” and was 
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purposed to address the clear lack of capability in existing security forces.126 
Both events indicate a struggling Sahwa enterprise, facing increasing pressure.  
In addition to the targeted attacks and the financial incentives to defect, 
the Islamic State also dealt an indirect blow to the Sahwa movement. The Islamic 
State’s actions directed at the state encouraged the Government of Iraq—and 
the security forces in particular—to exacerbate sectarian frustration in Iraq. The 
Sahwa movement was clearly aligned in the pro-government camp among the 
tribes. In the wake of multiple ISF crackdowns on protest movements, the tribal 
support for government agencies began to wane. Between the threat of death at 
the hands of the Islamic State, the lack of financial compensation, and the low 
support for the central government, there was little reason for young Sunnis to 
remain with the Sahwa.  
The Islamic State’s efforts to co-opt competing movements in Syria was 
much less successful than their efforts to do so in Iraq. Given this difficulty, the 
Islamic State was forced to pursue growth in Syria through eliminating competing 
movements. Unlike Iraq, the Syrian insurrection can be characterized as a highly-
parochial multilateral struggle between the Assad regime and an assortment of 
revolutionary groups.127 The parochial nature of the conflict presented a 
significant opportunity for the Islamic State to co-opt warring parties piecemeal 
using the methodology that proved successful in Iraq. However, nationalist 
dynamics in Syria seem to prevent insurgent groups from taking the “common 
enemy first” approach to the struggle. Despite the opportunity, this has inhibited 
the Islamic State from bringing the majority of revolutionary movements under 
their umbrella.  
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Within Syria, Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) is the Islamic State’s most significant 
rival revolutionary group. The movement was originally an off-shoot from the then 
Islamic State of Iraq. Mohammed al-Joulani, a Syrian member of the Islamic 
State, left Iraq for Syria with a small cadre and financial resources.128 Al-Joulani 
was able to capitalize on support networks in Syria that previously supported 
AQI/ISI during the years of American occupation. Supporters who once facilitated 
the travel of weapons and foreign fighters into Iraq, were now at al-Joulani’s 
disposal for developing a new organization.129  
More than a year after Jabhat al-Nusrah’s coming into existence, the 
Islamic State sought to capitalize on its Syrian investment and claim JN as its 
own, becoming a trans-national organization. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). Al-Joulani 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri would both reject this claim, and declare Jabhat al-
Nusrah and the Islamic State separate organizations.130 Zawahiri’s declaration is 
understandable, as a unified Iraq-Syria organization would marginalize the role of 
Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership. Although there would be no easy victory, the 
Islamic State sought a westward expansion through co-opting their rivals in Syria.  
Although unverified, the @wikibaghdady twitter account provided an inside 
report of the events following the fallout between Jabhat al-Nusrah and the 
Islamic State. The account indicates Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and senior IS leaders 
traveled to Syria around the time of al-Zawahiri’s declaration, hoping to meet with 
senior JN members in person. IS members conveyed to JN’s leadership their 
plans to unify the movements, and encouraged JN to make the announcement 
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themselves. Joulani reportedly rejected this request on the basis that it would 
degrade JN’s support among the Syrian population.131  
This rejection was followed by Islamic State efforts to assassinate select 
Jabhat al-Nusrah leaders—those particularly uncooperative—and seize JN 
logistics nodes. The account continues, reporting failed assassinations, distrust, 
defections, and open hostility that resulted in a permanent schism.132 It is 
possible the account has an agenda all its own—or perhaps is even managed by 
a regional intelligence agency—but Joulani’s perspectives on unification highlight 
a dynamic of the Syrian campaign.133 Joulani recognized the importance of 
popular Syrian support to Jabhat al-Nusrah.  
After the start of the JN-IS schism, many foreign fighters left the ranks of 
Jabhat al-Nusrah to join the Islamic State. IS boasts more international appeal, 
and has more foreign fighters within its ranks. In May of 2013, many foreign 
fighters defected from JN for the Islamic State.134 However, the purification of JN 
into a more-Syrian organization has boosted the movement’s appeal with the 
Syrian population.135  
Following the failure to unify JN and the Islamic State, IS pursued efforts 
to co-opt competing groups using a similar methodology to that employed in Iraq. 
While other revolutionary groups focused on deposing the Assad regime, the 
Islamic State deployed fighters in the rear areas. Like in Iraq, the Islamic State 
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sought to allow government forces and rival groups to directly engage each 
other, while preserving its own man power.136  
Unlike Iraq, there would be no “common enemy first” approach in Syria. In 
January of 2014, nearly 500 casualties were incurred during fighting between 
insurgent groups in Raqqa.137 The month would serve as a turning point, as 
conflict between the Islamic State and other groups reached new heights. During 
this month, the Islamic State assassinated senior Ahrar al-Sham leader Abu 
Rayyan—a move denounced by other factions.138 Shortly after, the Syria 
Revolutionaries’ Front—which consists of several insurgent groups—published a 
list of eleven grievances against Islamic State.139 This announcement coincided 
with formation of the Mujihadeen Army, and a widespread offensive against 
Islamic State-held territory near Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo.140 The inability to co-
opt competing movements resulted in a substantial Islamic State effort to 
eliminate them.  
Aside from eliminating selected competing movements, evidence 
suggests the Islamic State is seeking to eliminate at least one Sunni tribe. The 
Albu Nimr Tribe, which has traditionally opposed the Islamic State and its 
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previous existences, was significantly targeted in the fall of 2014.141 At the end of 
October, the remains of executed Albu Nimr tribal members were turning up 
large numbers.142 The Iraq Body Count database has recorded nine incidents 
from October through December, 2014 where Albu Nimr members died in large 
quantities. The database estimates that between 300 and 434 tribesmen were 
killed during this period.143 Some media outlets have reported the number 
exceeded 500.144 
C. EVIDENCE NOT SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS DIRECTED AT COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
The preceding evidence suggests that successful Islamic State actions to 
co-opt competing movements facilitated its growth. Co-opted movements, 
through either alliances or integration, serve as force multipliers and enable the 
Islamic State to achieve a monopoly over the population. However, evidence 
associated with the Islamic State’s actions to eliminate rival movements—
particularly in Syria—seem to bear less fruit.  
The conflict in Syria remains highly fragmented, with major revolutionary 
movements such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra fulling opposing the 
Islamic State. While the Islamic State has seized key terrain in Syria, it has done 
so without eliminating significant opposition from competing movements.145 The 
movement’s growth in the face of this opposition is potentially due to other 
factors. For instance, the Syrian Regime appears to target other revolutionary 
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movement far more frequently than the Islamic State.146 The inequitable 
pressure from the state may offset the Islamic State’s inability to effectively 
eliminate competing movements, resulting in movement growth that would 
otherwise not occur.  
D. CONCLUSIONS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT 
COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
The Islamic State conducted revolutionary actions directed at competing 
movements with varying degrees of success. IS enjoyed significant success co-
opting competing revolutionary movements in Iraq, and eventually garnered tacit 
levels of support from some tribal organizations. Within Syria, efforts to co-opt 
competing movements were far less successful, which forced the Islamic State to 
pursue growth through elimination.  
Islamic State efforts to eliminate rival groups in Syria has garnered 
inconclusive results. Significant rival movements remain active in the conflict, 
despite significant IS efforts to eliminate these groups. The success IS has 
experienced within Syria may also be in part to the pressure the Assad regime 
maintains on these groups, and not from IS actions.  
However, eliminating rival groups—such as the Sahwa movement and the 
Albu Nimr tribal forces—within Iraq has given the Islamic State a monopoly over 
the vast majority of Sunni-dominated regions. The Islamic State grew through co-
opting rival movements, and where co-option was not possible elimination of 
rivals offered a means to continue growth in the face of opposition. With 
competing movements either co-opted or eliminated, the Islamic State was then 
able to monopolize the population, given the movement the opportunity to extract 
resources and onward expand.  
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IV. REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT 
THE POPULATION 
The third category of revolutionary actions are those directed at the 
population. These consist of two subcomponents: actions that control the 
population and actions that extract resources. These activities—depicted in 
Figure 4—are not commenced after the cessation of hostilities, but concurrently 
with revolutionary movement growth into new geographic spaces. However, most 
revolutionary movements seek to establish a new political and social system. Not 
only is governance the desired ends, it is a means to the ends. 
Understanding how the Islamic State interacted with its constituents is 
central to understanding how the movement grew. Information operations, such 
as execution videos, Dabiq magazine, and other provincial-level publications 
have garnered significant attention and analysis—as they are undoubtedly 
significant efforts to inform and control the population both domestic and 
abroad.147 However, this chapter will address the principally internal facet 
through the analysis of internal Islamic State documents, which provide a 
glimpse into their approach to governance.  
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Figure 4.  Revolutionary Actions Directed at the Population 
Evidence will show the Islamic State has a robust system of governance 
that seeks to control the population by the provision of services and the strict 
enforcement of laws. The Islamic State established functional Diwans (councils) 
that specialize in cabinet-like areas of responsibility, and oversee government 
activities. These activities created an environment that was difficult and 
dangerous for individuals to rebel against. This subsequently enables other 
Islamic State institutions to extract human and material resources from the 
population without resistance. Despite the movement’s claims of establishing an 
Islamic Utopia, the brutality of the movement did drive many people to flee its 
territory. This exposes the limits on the effectiveness of their activities that target 
the population. 
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS TO CONTROL THE POPULATION 
When revolutionary movements provide essential services to the 
population, the population responds by viewing the movement with increased 
legitimacy. The Islamic State’s Diwan al-Khidamat—literally, the Council for 
Services—oversees the provision of utilities within the movement’s territory. 
Internal documents from the Diwan al-Khidamat show the Islamic State’s desire 
to improve upon the services formerly provided by the state.  
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Captured documents show the Diwan al-Khidamat establishing fixed 
prices for utilities in various cities. Documents from Raqqa and Mosul reveal the 
Islamic State standardizing the cost and hours for electrical services. Other 
documents show the Diwan al-Khidamat overseeing trash removal, public 
transportation, and urban water supplies.148   
Other captured documents from the Diwan al-Khidamat reveal efforts to 
reduce corruption levels. Specifically, the council established standardized office 
hours for electricity, water, and health offices in Anbar province. In Raqqa, 
documents show the Islamic State publishing acceptable business practices with 
fines for failures to adhere. Also in Raqqa, the Diwan al-Khidamat established an 
office to receive complaints regarding service-related issues.149 
A second council that provided public goods is the Diwan al-Sihha, which 
oversaw the Islamic State’s health services. Captured documents show this 
council overseeing the education of medical professionals, control of medicinal 
narcotics, and price regulation for medical procedures.150 Like the Council for 
Services, the provision of health services can offer a degree of normalcy to the 
population living within Islamic State territory. Providing these services 
contributed to establishing a social contract between the movement and the 
population—the provision on public services in exchange for subordination. 
Two other Islamic State councils provided services that also contributed to 
the public good, but also sought to indoctrinate the population into Islamic State 
society. The first was the Council for Education, called the Diwan al-Ta’lim. The 
second was the Diwan al-Da’wah wa al-Masjid, which was the Council for 
Outreach and Mosques.  
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The Islamic State Council for Education—at the national and provincial 
levels—established guidelines for class schedules, maintained student registries, 
and standardizes exams. At face value, these act like simple public goods, 
similar to the health and services councils. However, the education council 
practiced indoctrination of the population through two mechanisms of influence.  
The first influence mechanism was the control and standardization over 
instructional materials used in classrooms. Captured documents from the Mosul 
area show subject lists for 1st, 2nd, and 5th grade students. For 1st grade students, 
four out of the nine subjects taught in the classroom were religious classes. For 
2nd and 5th grade students, five out of the ten course subjects were religious 
studies.151 Diwan al-Ta’lim also managed a youth program called—not so 
originally—the cub scouts. This program was for boys aged 10–15 and provides 
religious and military training.152 Standardized religious study is not inherently 
wrong, and there is a strong chance the proportion of religious studies as part of 
standardized education rivals that of other Middle Eastern states. However, a 
public notice was recovered in Wilayat al-Kheir (Hasakah Province, Syria) that 
documents the prohibition of employment for selected individuals who would not 
provide instruction concurrent with jihadist ideology.153 Ostensibly, those who 
remain employed are providing instruction that does support such an ideology.  
The second influence mechanism wielded by the Council of Education 
was their authority over teachers. Across provinces in Iraq and Syria, Diwan al-
Ta’lim issued periodic requests for teachers to come forward and repent. 
Documents indicate that the education council maintained an Islamic Police-like 
authority over individuals who were involved in the education system.154 
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Repenters, especially those who were teachers prior to the establishment of the 
Islamic State were documented, with their previous infractions noted—perhaps 
for use as future leverage. The council required repenters to attend religious re-
education. Those suspected of non-conforming were identified by the council and 
prohibited from working.  
The standardization of jihadi instruction, with the coercive power 
maintained over educators, provided the Islamic State with the opportunity to 
greatly influence the next generation. With the entire Islamic State population 
learning jihadi interpretations of Islam, the social barriers that may prevent the 
acceptance of this ideology were eroded. Indoctrination of the next generation 
will theoretically make controlling the population within the Islamic State easier in 
the future. 
Diwan al-Da’wah wa al-Masjid, the Council for Outreach and Mosques, 
was also deeply concerned with the indoctrination of Islamic State constituents. 
Captured documents show the council hosting Quran memorization competitions 
in a variety of provinces.155 The council issued guidance to Imams on the topics 
of their Friday sermons, and coordinates times for services.156 In the Iraqi 
province of Nineveh, there were at least three instances where the council issued 
a complete sermon for reading during Friday services. Two of these sermons 
clearly divided the population into in-groups and out-groups. The first divided the 
population as believers and non-believers, and the second divided the population 
as Sunni Muslims, and all others as non-believers—to include Shia Muslims.157 
These portrayals reinforced Sunni identity against the predominantly-Shia central 
government—making defection from the movement to the state increasingly 
difficult.  
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Three other relevant documents attributable to the Council on Outreach 
and Mosques actually predate the so-called caliphate or the formal existence of 
the Islamic State. In December of 2013—prior to the Islamic State’s clear 
establishment of control of Raqqa, Syria—the Diwan al-Da’wah wa al-Masjid was 
publishing guidance on acceptable practices and the establishment of religious 
police.158 It appears that the Islamic State used religious indoctrination not just as 
a means of maintaining control, but as a tool to establish or seize territory from 
rival groups. This principle was documented in the well-circulated article from Der 
Spiegel in April of 2014 that implicated the Diwan al-Da’wah as an integral office 
for establishing control in new communities.159 This journalistic source has not 
made public their captured documents, but the reporting is otherwise consistent 
with the available evidence.  
The councils described above sought to control the population through 
both the provision of services, and shifting ideologies into harmony with the 
Islamic State. Other Islamic State councils provided the teeth to their 
governance, enforcing their established laws. While the rule of law is a form of 
public service by itself, the following organizations truly serve to inhibit possible 
internal discord.  
The Diwan al-Hisbah, the Council for Islamic Police, was responsible for 
the punishment of individuals who did not comply with the established standards 
of behavior within the Islamic State. Captured documents from the Diwan al-
Hisbah have shown acceptable punishments for various crimes. These included 
death and even crucifixion for a litany of crimes—including blasphemy, spying for 
non-believers, adultery, and highway criminality.160 Theft was punished with the 
amputation of a hand, or a hand and foot. The Council for Islamic Police stated in 
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their publications their intentions to bring judgments of death without exception, 
and their desire to make the people fear their lord. Other punishments include 
lashes and re-education for missing prayer times, lying, or consuming alcohol. 
Other documents from the Islamic Police have shown their willingness to close 
barbershops for shaving beards and fining individuals for illegal parking.  
The strength of coercive power is determined by two variables, magnitude 
of the negative action and the likelihood of its enforcement against a subject.161 
The severity of punishments within the Islamic State is well established by the 
Diwan al-Hisbah, and well understood within the realm of public knowledge 
across the globe from a variety of video recordings. What is undetermined is the 
Islamic police’s ability to identify the crimes—which would serve as the likelihood 
of enforcement of negative reinforcement. To support their efforts to enforce 
crime, the Diwan al-Hisbah has required all male individuals to register at their 
offices for photo identification cards.162 These ID cards, which men are required 
to maintain on their person at all times, eliminate anonymity within the 
population.163  
The degree of the effectiveness of population control measures is difficult 
to determine from outside the Islamic State. However, if the strength of coercive 
power is a function of severity of punishment and likelihood of punishment, we 
can infer from the nature of punishments alone. The great severity of 
punishments, coupled with the public and graphic enforcement of the death 
penalty, created an incredible pressure to comply with the Islamic States laws. 
Over time, individuals began to identify with the source of the coercive power, 
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and subsequently less coercive power was required for the same effect, or 
constant levels of coercive power produce increased levels of obedience.164 
The Diwan al-Amn is the second Islamic State council focused on 
enforcing population control. The council for public security primarily focused on 
policing the communication of Islamic State constituents. The Diwan al-Amn has 
created requirements to monitor individuals using the Internet.  
First, the Council for Public Security mandated that both public Internet 
cafes and private residences remove Wi-Fi access to the Internet.165 This forced 
individuals to physically plug into an Internet connection, removing a degree of 
anonymity. Secondly, the Diwan al-Amn created requirements for both public 
Internet café managers and private Internet users. Internet Café managers were 
required to record the photo ID of all store patrons, and maintain a log of these 
individuals.166 This gave the Council for Public Security the ability to determine 
who is accessing what information on the Internet. Even without actually making 
inspections, the recording of personal information during public computer usage 
likely influenced their communication given the potential punishments for 
blasphemy or apostasy.  
In addition to the documents describing policing the Internet, the council 
for public security, like other councils made public calls for repentance.167 The 
council also made a public statement in Wilayat Halab after removing a public 
official for using his position for personal gain.168 These documents indicate the 
Diwan al-Amn has similar authorities to the Diwan al-Hisbah, with special 
emphasis on policing and regulating the Internet.  
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Although the evidence of Diwan al-Amn activity is limited, consisting of 
only a dozen documents, the organization clearly provided an internal policing 
function within the Islamic State. The lack of captured documents may be due to 
a degree of secrecy that would be similar to typical intelligence collection 
agencies. Together with the Diwan al-Hisbah, this council reinforced the control 
of the population within the Islamic State, making resistance extremely 
dangerous.  
B. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS TO EXTRACT RESOURCES 
While the Council for Taxation, Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat, was 
involved with providing a form of social security, its principal purpose was 
extracting financial resources from the population. There are limited numbers of 
captured documents from the taxation council, but the evidence does indicate the 
council was responsible for taxation of wealthier members of the Islamic State. 
Aside from social security, these funds were available for the salaries of soldiers 
and public sector works, enabling the movement to further grow.169 
A second council focused on extracting resources from the population was 
the Diwan al-Rikaz. This council oversaw the management of oil and antiquities 
within the Islamic State. There were few captured documents that illustrate how 
the Islamic State managed its access to the region’s most precious resource. 
Captured documents included a receipt for a domestic oil purchase, and general 
oil oversight guidance for Deir ez-Zor, Syria.170 However, the movement’s efforts 
to sell oil on the black market were documented in the media. Turkish 
parliamentary member claimed in the summer of 2014 that the Islamic State 
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smuggled roughly $800 million USD worth of oil into Turkey.171 Iraqi estimates 
from the same time period placed IS oil revenues at roughly $1 million USD per 
day.172 The U.S. Treasury Department projected the movement’s oil earnings at 
roughly $40 million USD per month.173 Regardless of the exact figure, it is clear 
that oil is a significant IS resource to support revolutionary actions.  
Other documents from the Diwan al-Rikaz highlighted another IS 
resource, antiquities. Captured documents show the council oversaw digging 
permits and published notices for security check points to confiscate precious 
materials.174 There was a degree of uncertainty regarding how profitable these 
endeavors were. The U.S. raid on the IS finance minister, Abu Sayaff, yielded 
documents indicating antiquities sales on the black market in Syria garnered 
roughly $265,000 US over a 12-month period.175 While beneficial, this is hardly 
sufficient for sustaining a revolutionary movement’s efforts within the nation.  
As discussed earlier, the Council for Outreach and Mosques provided 
services and influence to the population to solidify its control. However, another 
documented activity of the Diwan al-Da’wah wa al-Masjid was the recruitment of 
individuals to serve as Islamic State soldiers. In Albukamal of Wilayat al-Furat—
that straddles the Iraq-Syria border—the Council for Outreach conducted a 
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recruitment effort in December of 2014 for males aged fifteen or older. The flier 
described the effort as a response to the command of God.176 It should be noted 
that recruitment is conducted by the council for outreach and mosques, and not 
by the Council for the Military (Diwan al-Jund). While an individual may not 
volunteer at first, after weeks of attending selected sermons and fundamentalist 
training, the slow and steady increase in participation makes volunteering as a 
soldier much easier. The council for outreach and mosques provided Islamic 
State constituents opportunity for both acceptance and implementation.  
Another Islamic State council recruiting soldiers is the Council for Fatwas 
and Doctrine—Diwan al-Ifta wa al-Buluth. In Wilayat al-Halab (Aleppo Province, 
Syria), the council conducted a call for mobilization in October of 2015. This 
recruitment effort was likely significant, as three separate documents attributable 
to the effort were obtained, and sought to perpetuate the religious obligation to 
fight under the phrase of “go forth, lightly and heavily armed.”177 This effort 
demonstrates using a religious mandate for the purpose of extracting human 
resources from the population. 
 
C. EVIDENCE NOT SUPPORTING ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY 
ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE POPULATION 
Despite the robust government structures within the Islamic State, 
evidence exists their actions directed at the population were failing to achieve full 
success. The brutality of the Islamic State runs contrary to what most civilizations 
accept as basic human rights. This brutality is connected to the exodus of many 
individuals from Islamic State territory.  
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The Islamic State Council for Fatwas and Doctrine published guidance 
clarifying that Alawites, disbelievers, Yazidis, Shias, Jews, and Christians were 
all acceptable targets for sex slavery, which is hardly an acceptable practice by 
modern standards.178 Other sources of discourse for Islamic State constituents 
were the prohibition of cigarettes and alcohol. Consuming either substance is 
punishable with a prison sentence, and many with the means the flee from the 
Islamic State are doing so.179 Captured documents from the Diwan al-Sihha 
reinforce the notion that the Islamic State was struggling with individuals fleeing 
from its territory. These documents suggest the council was struggling to 
maintain control over qualified medical professionals.180 Many migrants who left 
the Islamic State point to the harshness of life within the movement’s territory as 
their reason for fleeing.181 
This evidence suggests the Islamic State is not effectively handling the 
population. If the population is fleeing its regions of control, their demands of the 
population are exceeding their ability to control it. This creates a sustainability 
problem for the movement that it must overcome.  
D. CONCLUSIONS FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS DIRECTED AT THE 
POPULATION 
The database of captured Islamic State documents provides great insight 
into the inner workings of an extremist organization. The documents of the five 
councils described in this chapter indicate a governing apparatus that was well 
organized for maintaining power and influence within the Islamic State. 
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Independently, the councils maintain levers of influence over the population. 
However, their effects are combined across their organizations, reinforcing their 
power of influence and control into an effort without gaps. The redundancy 
between the councils reinforces the consistent pressure to accept the jihadist 
ideology. The existence of multiple security apparatuses ensures there is an 
organization that is policing those who are enforcing ridged laws. Additionally, the 
dating of the documents is very insightful. The existence of documents that 
predate clear regional control—such as prior to the fall of Mosul—shows that 
controlling the population is not an end state, but a means of attaining control.  
There are more factors in play than just the publications of the councils 
this chapter focused on. Although not discussed in depth in this chapter, there is 
evidence of other councils providing an influential effect on the population. For 
the needy, the Diwan al-Zakat wa al-Sadaqat provides food and shelter for those 
in need of welfare.182 This builds positive rapport, and also a dependency on the 
state that is not easily broken by the recipients. Also, the Islamic State maintains 
a massive public relations enterprise, the Diwan al-Aqat wa al-Amma. The 
council oversaw the production of numerous quality media products. While many 
products target individuals beyond the borders of the Islamic State, there is an 
immeasurable effect on the internal population.  
All of these activities contribute to the Islamic State’s ability to maintain 
control over its population and extract resources. What remains to be seen is 
whether these levers of influence outweigh those that drive individuals away from 
the Islamic State. In time, will the education programs and enforcement 
mechanisms outpace the opposition’s ability to degrade the Islamic States 
military and economic power?  
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Starting in late 2011, the Islamic State began a substantial period of 
growth. With an estimated 700 movement members remaining at that time, IS 
initiated a campaign that in roughly 30 months resulted in the proclamation of a 
so-called caliphate across significant regions of Iraq and Syria. Using a model of 
revolutionary growth, this thesis analyzed major components of this campaign 
and developed new understanding of how the Islamic State returned to 
prominence. This model appears to be an effective tool for evaluating the Islamic 
State. The revolutionary growth model's expectations regarding actions directed 
at the state, at competing movements, and the population have been supported 
by the actions of the Islamic State and other parties involved in the conflict. While 
this model is not intended to fully explain all aspects of a revolutionary struggle, it 
is effective in describing how the Islamic State has grown. What remains to be 
determined is the applicability of this growth model to other regions where the 
Islamic State is present.  
A.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The Islamic State committed considerable resources to actions directed at 
the state. Between 2011 and 2014, IS conducted over 1,250 car bomb attacks in 
Iraq. The magnitude of this deadly undertaking—especially considering less than 
100 occurred during 2011—is rather shocking. The Islamic State averaged more 
than one car bomb per day for three consecutive years. Most governments would 
respond with force in the face of such a sustained and violent assault.  
The Iraqi government’s response to the attacks was precisely what the 
Islamic State hoped, and true to Zarqawi's vision in 2004. Iraqi security 
institutions lacked the capacity to effectively develop the intelligence needed to 
conduct precision operations against the Islamic State. Given this deficiency, the 
ISF flailed wildly at the collective Sunni protest movement—killing dozens whom 
Sunni society presumed were wholly innocent of any crimes. Inciting these 
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attacks may have proven less fortunate for the Islamic State if Iraqi security 
institutions enjoyed a greater intelligence collection capacity. If the state was able 
to discriminate their violence and limit collateral damage, the effectiveness of the 
provocation strategy would likely be reduced.  
As limited as the ISF were at the outset of the Islamic State’s campaign in 
2011, their capability only eroded over time. As Iraq struggled to maintain the 
equipment provided by the multinational reconstruction mission, they continued 
to incur casualties at a greater rate as the fall of Mosul loomed. Concurrent with 
the degradation of the security sector, government functionality in the Sunni tribal 
belt also faltered. As the Islamic State killed many government administrators, 
countless others felt the pressure of the movement’s intimidating presence.  
With the ISF killing Sunnis by the dozens, governance breaking down, and 
state security institutions appearing ever weaker, the opportunity and motivation 
for revolution spread across northern and western Iraq. Revolutionary 
movements and tribal organizations began to grow in Iraq as they previously had 
in Syria. The Islamic State conducted revolutionary actions directed at these 
competing movements on both sides of the border.  
The Islamic State co-opted many competing movements in Iraq and Syria. 
Some integrated into the Islamic State, while others formed alliances to defeat 
common enemies. The Islamic State demonstrated consistent behavior towards 
other movements within Sunni alliances. IS encouraged its allies to continue the 
attack against the state, while they themselves focused on consolidating their 
control over geographic areas. This allowed competing movements to expend 
their resources against the state, while leaving IS resources available for 
eliminating rival movements—of which there were some. 
Particularly in Syria, the Islamic State sought to eliminate movements who 
were unwilling to accept co-option. Jabhat al-Nusrah—the Syrian affiliate of al 
Qaeda—is the most prolific opposition IS faced from other revolutionary 
movements. The Islamic State was not able to subdue JN and other movements, 
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and these organizations have checked IS growth in Syria. Within Iraq, the Islamic 
State was easily able to eliminate the Sahwa movement, which without its 
American benefactors was not up to the challenge of a motivated enemy. 
Actions directed at the state established the motivation and opportunity for 
revolution, and actions directed at competing movements solidified a monopoly in 
regions where IS successfully co-opted or eliminated competing movements. 
Actions directed at the population established IS control and access to 
resources. Governing is not only the desired ends for a revolutionary movement, 
it is also a means to achieve these ends. This Islamic State demonstrated a 
robust bureaucracy for both establishing control over and extracting resources 
from the population. While many of the movement’s practices—such as barbaric 
public executions and severe restrictions on personal freedoms—are extremely 
harsh and contrary to western values, the Islamic State did provide a degree of 
order to the territories they administered. Conversely, many with the means to do 
so are fleeing the Islamic State. This questions the degree of control that IS 
enjoys. At least in the short term, the movement garnered enough control to 
extract a significant amount of resources and sustain rapid growth.  
It is important to note the components of the Islamic State revolutionary 
growth model are not sequential. Some have described the actions of the Islamic 
State as a phased approach, with governance components as ordered efforts to 
support territorial control.183 This is characterization is inaccurate, as the three 
forms of revolutionary actions are mutually supporting efforts. Establishing 
governance over the population marginalizes other movements and the 
dependence upon the state. Actions against competing movements facilitate 
establishing control over the population. Targeting the incumbent government 
establishes the movement as the protectors of the population against the state, 
fostering control over the population. Research shows the Islamic State—
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perhaps more so than any other movement in Iraq and Syria—executes all three 
components concurrently.  
B. EXTENSIONS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE REVOLUTIONARY GROWTH 
MODEL 
Now that the Islamic State’s growth methodology is understood, this 
knowledge may benefit contemporary strategies to combat the movement. In Iraq 
and Syria, the Islamic State pursued actions against the state and competing 
movements with different degrees of emphasis. In Syria, a weakened central 
government allowed IS to focus on competing revolutionary movements. In Iraq, 
competing movements willing to accept co-option or succumb to elimination 
allowed IS to focus on the central government.  
Strategies to combat the Islamic State should be as comprehensive as 
possible. A campaign of attrition through airstrikes is a one-dimensional 
approach to countering the Islamic State's multi-dimensional campaign of 
revolutionary growth. Reinforcing the gaps in opposition against the Islamic State 
will force the movement to divide its efforts along more operational fronts. In 
Syria, breaking the financial relationship between the Assad regime and the 
Islamic State constitutes such an effort. Within Iraq, facilitating a competing 
Sunni movement—such as the Albu Nimr tribal organization—to represent 
moderate interests will prevent IS from focusing solely against the Iraqi Security 
Forces.  
Both of these strategies have challenges associated with them. Bashir al-
Assad is far from a suitable partner, and regime change may empower another 
fundamentalist movement. Within Iraq, facilitating a Sunni organization to 
challenge the Islamic State from within is difficult to balance with maintaining 
partnerships with the Baghdad government.  
Another extension of the Islamic State growth model is to apply it to 
Islamic State territories outside of Iraq and Syria. One significant location 
experiencing an expanding contingent of the Islamic State is Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan. Collectively identified as “Khorasan Province” of the Islamic State, the 
movement’s growth is contributing to U.S. apprehension regarding its draw-down 
of forces in the region. Following the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar, 
the Taliban is in a position of weakened central authority. Mullah Omar's 
replacement, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, was subsequently killed in May of 
2016.184 The leadership of the Taliban is increasingly fluid, which may support 
fracturing and infighting. Given this condition, we can anticipate the Islamic State 
will establish geographic control over small enclaves. A fragmented Taliban 
creates opportunities for the movement to encourage defectors with the promise 
of success and increased authority. However, the same condition—in fighting—
that facilitates the Islamic State’s efforts to establish small control zones will 
prevent it from becoming overly successful. As seen in Syria, there is a strong 
propensity for rival movements to actively engage each other while pursuing the 
overall goal of toppling the regime.  
These initial considerations are in need of further analysis. Understanding 
the Islamic State in Khorasan will become increasing important as the 
Government of Afghanistan and international partners seeks to terminate the 
conflict with the Taliban. Analysis of the Islamic State in Khorasan will inform 
strategic and operational decision makers as the conflict evolves into its next 
phase.  
Further analysis of the Islamic State will undoubtedly be undertaken by the 
academic community that focuses on internal conflict. The growth model and 
assessment of the Islamic State’s campaign to reconstitute itself from 2011 to 
2014 provides a tool for further study. Having returned from the brink of defeat, 
the Islamic State has proven to be a learning organization, revising strategy in 
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pursuit of its desired goal. All those opposing it must do the same in kind—
constantly learn, adapt, and persevere when victory appears unobtainable.  
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